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In his recent ar..cle in the Michigan Law Review, 1 entitled "The
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism," Professor James A. Gard-
ner examines the responses to Justice Brennan's invitation to state high
courts "to seize control of the protection of constitutional rights by
looking to state constitutions as potentially more generous guarantors of
individual rights than the U.S. Constitution."2 He finds the responses in
the "voluminous body of commentary" by "distinguished state jurists"
and "prolific academics" to be "extraordinarily optimistic about the
prospects for state constitutional law ... not only to meet J u s t i c e
Brennan's challenge, but to fulfill the promise of a genuinely federal
system of government."3 After examining "the status of state constitu-
tional law as it is practiced today," he finds "a vast wasteland of con-
fusing, conflicting and essentially unintelligible pronouncements." 4 This
wasteland is said to result from "the failure of state courts to develop a
coherent discourse of state constitutional'law."5 He does not find the
wasteland surprising, as a coherent discourse is deemed impossible
because state constitutions do not reflect the fundamental values, and
ultimately the character, of the people of the states that adopt them.6
He finds that "the notion of state constitutionalism .as defining distinc-
tive and coherent ways of life does not accurately describe state consti-
tutions."7 The description fails because "Americans are now a people
who are so alike from state to state, and whose identity is so much
associated with national values and institutions, that the notion of sig-
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nificant local variations in character and identity is just too implausible
to take seriously as the basis for a distinct constitutional discourse."8
The failure of a state's constitution and its interpretation to reflect its
people's values and character, and the present actual lack of local val-
ues and character, do not trouble Professor Gardner. Such a reflection
or local identity "could pose a serious threat to the nationwide stability
and sense of community that national constitutionalism provides." 9 In
many ways, Professor Gardner is thus happy to observe that Justice
Brennan's invited discourse on state constitutionalism has failed.
I leave to others, presumably excessively optimistic jurists and
academics, the task of responding to Professor Gardner's vision of the
real and ideal role of state constitutions and state high courts in guar-
anteeing individual rights. I will briefly explore the real and ideal role
of state constitutions and state high courts in defining state govern-
ments. There, in my view, state constitutionalism does more to fulfill
significantly the promise of a genuinely federal system of government;
there, states do, and should, acknowledge very different common
identities,10 and such differences do not endanger nationhood." By
focusing almost exclusively on individual rights, Professor Gardner has
not seriously considered the discourse of state constitutionalism on the
powers of government, on what factors explain any inadequate dis-
course in this area, and on what can be done to correct any discourse
deemed troubling. Hopefully, the following observations on governmen-
tal structure in state constitutions will serve to broaden the discussion
of state constitutionalism spurred by Professor Gardner's provocative
article. I begin by examining American constitutional law on individual
rights and governmental structure.
A. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
American constitutions are chiefly concerned with two areas: indi-
vidual rights and the structure of government. In the area of rights, an
American government's constitution may recognize such liberties as
freedom of speech, the right to vote, the right of privacy, due process,
freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial, and the right to equal
8. Id.
9. Id. Compare Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law? 34 ARI. L REV.
215, 229 (1992) ("Recognition that a right may be guaranteed in one state but not in another is
an uncomfortable idea ... [Y]et of course the uncomfortable idea is true.").
10. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 823.
11. Id. at 827.
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protection of the law. In the area of governmental identity, an Ameri-
can government's constitution typically will 1) establish the branches of
government; 2) describe some or most of the powers of these branches;
3) delegate to one governmental branch the responsibility for describing
at least some of the power of another governmental branch; and 4) ad-
dress the relationship of the government to other governments (both
American and foreign). While both federal and state constitutional
provisions focus on individual rights and on governmental structure,
their approaches to each are quite different.
In recognizing certain liberties, the federal constitution speaks not
only of rights secured against the national government, but also of
rights secured against state governments. Thus, state, constitutional pro-
visions on individual rights are not written or interpreted on a clean
slate. They must yield to the supremacy of rights guaranteed by federal
constitutional, statutory and common law. As Professor 'Gardner recog-
nizes, state constitutional rights are, at best, potentially only more gen-
erous than their federal counterparts.' Federal lierties predominate in
the individual rights area because there are few liberties associated
exclusively with state citizenship and because there are few liberties
associated with both federal and state citizenship on which federal law
has not spoken significantly.
By contrast, while the federal constitution defines the tripartite
scheme of the national government, it speaks little about the definition
of state government. Perhaps a tripartite scheme has been thought com-
pelled for all American governments, since all states have executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. There appears, however, to be no
perceived federal mandate regarding the particular powers of these
branches of state government. 3 As a result, a rich divergence exists in
state constitutional definitions of governmental authority. Many state
governments differ widely from each other and from the federal consti-
tutional approach to the tripartite scheme. This diversity may be exem-
plified by looking to contemporary state constitutional provisions on the
judiciary, with attention focused on court structure, the jurisdictional
authority of the courts, and judicial rulemaking. Additionally, individual
states have defined governmental authority quite differently* over time.
12. Id. at 762 (agreeing with Justice Brennan).
13. Professor Wolfram has observed: "Separation of powers doctrines of state and federal
constitutional law, in general terms, do not directly affect each other. Thus no federal constitu-
tional principle requires the states to follow, or restricts the states from adopting, any particular
conception of separation of powers among the branches of state government." CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Eimcs § 22.5 (1986).
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Intrastate changes in governmental structure may be illustrated by
looking to the various Illinois constitutional provisions on the judiciary.
These federal/state, interstate, and intrastate diversities suggest that "the
promise of a genuinely federal system of government" 4 has been at
least partially fulfilled.
B. THE DIVERSITIES IN STATE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES
A comparison of contemporary American state judicial articles
reveals diverse approaches to the allocation and use of judicial power.
Provisions on court structure and jurisdiction vary widely in the extent
of responsibility accorded legislatures to establish courts. For example,
in Illinois, little legislative power exists because the Illinois Constitution
vests the judicial power "in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and
Circuit Court," 5 and outlines nearly all of these courts' jurisdictional
authority.' 6 By contrast, other states grant the legislature broad respon-
s ibility over the judiciary. Rhode Island 17 and Maine, 8 for example,
vest judicial power in a supreme court and in such inferior courts as
the general assembly may establish. These provisions parallel Article III
of the federal constitution.' 9 Most state constitutions fall between these
extremes.
Many state constitutions create and empower some, but not all,
courts, and typically permit greater legislative initiatives regarding trial
courts of limited jurisdiction than with other courts. Michigan, for
instance, allocates judicial power to "one supreme court, one court of
appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction . . . one probate court,
and courts of limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a
two-thirds vote . . . ."20 Similarly, in Arizona the judicial power re-
sides in "a Supreme Court, such intermediate appellate courts as may
be provided by law, a superior court, such courts inferior to the supe-
rior court as may be provided by law, and justice courts."2'
14. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 763.
15. ILa. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
16. Id. at §5 4, 6, 9. The legislature may, however, provide for trial and intermediate ap-
pellate court review of administrative action, Id. at § 6, 9, and the high court may provide for
certain appeals lo it from the intermediate appellate court, Id. at § 4(c).
17. LI. CONST. art. X, § 1.
18. ME. CONST. art. VI, 5 1.
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, 5 1.
20. MICH. CONST. art. VI, at § 1. Only the high court is free of significant legislative di-
rectives. Id. at §§ 4, 10, 13, 15.
21. ARtZ. CONST. art. VI, § 1. In Hawaii, the judicial power is "vested in one supreme
court, one intermediate appellate court, circuit court, district courts and in such other courts as
the legislature may . . . establish." HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 1. In Iowa, the judicial power is
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Although state constitutional provisions on court authority vary,
the resulting judicial systems are frequently characterized as "unified".
For example, the self-proclaimed unified court system in Wisconsin
encompasses the constitutionally-created supreme court, court of appeals
and circuit court, as well as any legislatively-created municipal courts
or other trial courts of general jurisdiction.22 In North Carolina, the
unified system contains only the'Appellate, Superior and District Court
Divisions.? Unification in Idaho means a supreme court, district
courts and any other legislatively-created inferior courts.24 In Georgia
it means magistrate, probate, juvenile, state and superior courts that
operate at the trial level325
State constitutional provisions on judicial rulemaking in areas such
as civil, criminal and appellate procedure, evidence, and attorney and
judicial conduct are also quite diverse. These provisions differ regarding
the composition of judicial rulemaking bodies, as well as the oversight
role of the legislature.
State judicial rulemaking bodies typically encompass individuals or
groups including at least one judge and possessing some
decisionmaking responsibility for rules affecting the judicial system.2
Many state high courts are recognized constitutionally as judicial rule-
makers. State constitutions often 'delegate to courts of last resort duties
regarding civil, criminal, appellate and professional conduct rules.
vested in a Supreme Court, District Courts, and other inferior courts established by the legisla-
ture. IOWA CONST. art. V, § 1. In New Mexico, the state's judicial power is "vested in the
senate when sitting as a court of impeachment... "N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
22. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
23. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
24. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 2. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1 (vesting judicial
power in a supreme court, superibr court and courts established by the legislature).
25. GA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2.
26. A review of American judicial rulemaking bodies is found in Jeffrey A. Parness &
Christopher C. Manthey, Public Process and State Judicial Rulemaking, 1 PACE L. REV. 121
(1980). Of course, not all constitutionally-based exercises of judicial rulemaking have express
recognition in the relevant state constitution. See, eg., Ronald C. Morton, Note, Rules,
Rulemaking and the Ruled: The Mississippi Supreme Court as Self-Proclaimed Ruler, 12 MISS.
C.L. REV. 293, 334 (1991) (concluding that the Mississippi high court has decreed an inherent
power to self-rule).
27. See, eg., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (rules governing the administration of all
courts, as well as rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all
courts); ARIz. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (rules relative to all procedural matters in any court); ARK.
CONST. of 1874 amend. 28 (rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of
attorneys at law); KY CONST. § 116 (rules governing its appellate jurisdiction, the appointment
of court personnel,' practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission and discipline of
lawyers); NJ. CONST. art. VI, § II (rules governing the administration of all courts and, subject
to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (rules of pro-
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California, however, empowers a Judicial Council to adopt "rules for
court administration, practice and procedure";2 the Judicial Council
contains judges from a variety of courts, as well as members of the
state bar and a few legislators.2 In New York, the high court's chief
judge has extensive rulemaking responsibility for "standards and ad-
ministrative policies for general application throughout the state."30 By
comparison, the federal constitution is silent on judicial rulemaking, and
federal judges normally look to Congress for the recognition of their
power to make rules.3
As with judicial rulemaking, American constitutions vary regarding
the role of the legislature in overseeing as with acts of judicial
rulemaking. Some states mandate that judicial rules not contravene any
existing statutes,32 while others dictate that judicial rules not conflict
with statutes addressing only certain topics.33 Other states, however,
seemingly permit judicial rules to supersede statutes.3
cedure, including appellate procedure, for all courts, as well as rules and regulations for the
admission to practice, conduct, disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law); OHIO CONST.
art. IV, § 5(a)(1) (rules regarding general superintendence over all courts). Of course, distin-
guishing the appropriate realms for procedural rules from the realms of substantive law is often
difficult, if not impossible. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Baumann, et al., Substance in the Shadow of
Procedure. The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 211, 219 (1992) (substance and procedure are inseparable in the context of Title VII).
28. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
29. Id. On the operation of the California Judicial Council, see Rebecca Kuzins, 6 Cal.
Lawyer 43 (Sept. 1986). By contrast, in Alaska, the constitutionally-established judicial council
conducts studies and makes reports and recommendations to the supreme court and to the legis-
lature. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 9.
30. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 28. In New Hampshire, the chief justice, with the concurrence
of a majority of justices, makes many of the rules. N.H. CONST. art. 73-a.
31. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a) (1988) (art. Ill court rulemaking), 2072(a) (Supreme
Court rulemaking in practice, procedure and evidence areas), and 2075 (Supreme Court
rulemaking in bankruptcy area). In the area of attorney regulation, perhaps the most significant
area in which state court inherent rulemaking power is asserted, Professor Wolfram has found:
Thus it seems safe to say that the Supreme Court would not invalidate an act of
Congress regulating the legal profession on a separation-of-powers ground, except
in the highly unlikely event that an act were passed that attempted to interfere
directly with judicial functions, such as by severely restricting the right to coun-
sel, an interference that would more likely be struck down on right-to-counsel or
similar grounds relating to the rights of litigants.
See Wolfram, supra note 13. On the history of such inherent authority, see, e.g., Thomas M.
Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Anal-
ysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525 (1983). On the inherent power to compel funding, another major
area almost exclusively addressed by state courts, see Ted Z. Robertson and Christa Brown, The
Judiciary's Inherent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners,
20 ST. MARY'S LJ. 863 (1989).
32. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 and NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 25.
33. MO. CONST. art. V, § 5 (rules cannot alter laws on evidence, the oral examination of
witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal).
34. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (laws in conflict with rules have no further force or ef-
UNEVEN DISCOURSE
American constitutions also vary on whether judicial rulemakers
must submit their rules to legislative review. In Ohio, proposed practice
and procedure rules cannot take effect unless the General Assembly has
had the opportunity to adopt "a concurrent resolution of disappro-
val."3 In South Carolina, however, similar proposals take effect unless
three-fifths of the members of each house disapprove. 6 By contrast,
some states constitutionally recognize legislative oversight of judicial
rulemakers only after the rules take effect. For example, the Florida
Supreme Court can adopt rules of practice without seeking the legis-
lature's approval.3 7 However, these rules "may be repealed by general
law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house."3
In Maryland, judicial rules have force "until rescinded, changed or
modified... by law."39 In Montana, practice and procedure, profes-
sional conduct, and appellate procedure rules are "subject to disapproval
by the legislature in- either of the two sessions following promul-
gation." 40
A brief review of Illinois judicial articles reveals that comparable
diversities in approaches to governmental structure can be part of a
single state's history. Under the 1818 Constitution, governmental pow-
ers in Illinois were divided among the legislative, executive and judicial
departments; no department could exercise any powers of another un-
less "expressly directed or permitted." 41 The legislative department
was, however, granted significant duties regarding the judicial depart-
ment. For example, one constitutional provision said: "The judicial
power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court and such
inferior courts as the general assembly shall ... ordain and es-
tablish." 42 Other provisions authorized the General Assembly to pro-
vide for justices of the peace43 and to require high court justices to
"hold circuit courts."'
fect). Cf. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) ("exclusive" high court authority to make rules for the
Appellate Division).
35. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
36. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4A.
37. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
38. Id. Similar is ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (two-thirds vote to change a rule).
39. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a) (practice and procedure rules). Comparable is MO. CONST.
art. V, § 5 (practice rules may be annulled or amended by a law limited to the purpose).
40. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
41. IL. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 2.
42. IL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1.
43. Id. at § 8.
44. Id. at § 4.
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Under the 1848 Constitution, General Assembly duties regarding
the judiciary were continued, but reduced. The General Assembly could
authorize "courts of justice" to grant divorces and could direct "in what
manner- suits may be brought against the state."4s It could no longer
require high court justices to hold circuit courts. Most importantly, the
Assembly's total control over lower courts was eliminated. A new
provision declared:
The judicial power of this state shall be, and is hereby, vested in
one supreme court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justic-
es of the peace; Provided, that inferior local courts ... may be
established by the general assembly in the cities ... but such
courts shall have a uniform organization and jurisdiction ... 4
All lower courts were no longer established by the General Assembly.
The jurisdiction of the circuit courts was defined constitutionally.4
Yet, the duties of county judges and justices of the peace continued to
be prescribed chiefly by the legislature.8
Under the 1870 Constitution, there was a further erosion of legis-
lative authority. The General Assembly could not pass local or special
laws in areas such as regulating the practice in courts of justice, the
jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police magistrates and
constables, changes of venue, or any other area where a general law
could be made applicable.49 Furthermore, legislative control was di-
minished by new provisions prescribing much of the jurisdictional au-
thority of county and probate courts.m The 1870 Constitution did rec-
ognize General Assembly power to create "inferior appellate courts"51
and to establish a "Probate Court in each county having a population
of over fifty thousand."'
General Assembly responsibility for the Illinois judiciary was
dramatically reduced again by the 1962 constitutional amendments. One
amendment said: "The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Courts."53 No longer were any lower
courts established legislatively. Other amendments eliminated much
45. IUL. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § § 32, 34.
46. Id. at § 1.
47. Id. at art. V, § 8.
48. Id. at § 19.
49. ILL CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22.
50. Id. at art. VI, §§ 18, 20.
51. Id. at § 11.
52. Id. at § 20.
53. Ia. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 1 (1962).
UNEVEN DISCOURSE
legislative authority over the jurisdiction of the lower courtss4 and
declared that the Supreme Court was vested with "general administra-
tive authority over all courts," 5 with no express recognition of the
opportunity for General Assembly review.
The movement toward increased judicial rulemaking in Illinois
continued under the 1970 Constitution. Thus, while a 1962 amendment
granted the Supreme Court the authority to provide by rule for direct
appeals in certain cases, "subject to law hereafter enacted," 5 the new
constitution allowed the Supreme Court. to provide for such appeals
without mentioning legislative enactments. 57 The new constitution also
required that matters assigned to associate judges be guided by Su-
preme Court rules and that the "Supreme Court ... adopt rules of
conduct for Judges and Associate Judges," 59 again with no mention of
legislative review.
The trend in Illinois and elsewhere reflects diminishing legislative
influence on the judiciary. The legislature's power to create courts and
procedural law has diminished over time. Increasingly there have been
constitutional mandates regarding the state courts, whose ambiguities
are ultimately clarified by judges. Thus, judges are increasingly com-
pelled to define the contours of their constitutional duties. In this set-
ting an increased judicial responsibility for procedural law is more
frequently recognized.
C. PROFESSOR GARDNER'S FAILED DISCOURSE ON DIvERSmES IN
GOVERNMENTAL STRUCrURE
Professor Gardner would not be surprised that state courts occa-
sionally fail to appreciate the significance of such federal/state, inter-
state, and intrastate diversities in governmental structure.60 I have my-
self demonstrated elsewhere such a failure by comparing two 1977 state
high court rulings involving the constitutionality of statutes mandating
54. With respect to circuit courts, compare Article VI, section 12 of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution with the 1962 version of Article VI, section 9. Regarding the Appellate Courts,
compare Article VI, section Il with the 1962 version of Article VI, section 7.
55. lu. CoNsT. of 1870, art. VI, § 2 (1962).
56. Id. at § 5.
57. IL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
58. Iu. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
59. Id. at § 13(a).
60. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 808 ("state courts have adopted the federal analysis and
terms of debate not merely when construing dependent provisions governed by Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation, but also for many independent state constitutional provisions that fed-
eral law - as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment - is powerless to affect").
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that judicial rulemaking hearings be noticed and open to the public. 61
In deeming a Michigan law an unconstitutional "intrusion into the most
basic day-to-day exercise of the constitutionally derived judicial pow-
ers,"62 the Michigan court quite reasonably relied upon state constitu-
tional provisions expressly recognizing judicial rulemaking powers and
superintending controls without providing for legislative oversight. By
contrast, in declaring a similar Nevada law "an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the inherent powers of the judiciary which violates the
doctrine of separation of powers," 63 the Nevada court was too conclu-
sory, misleading in its discussion of the Nevada judicial article, and
unconsciously disrespectful of the constitutional schemes in other Amer-
ican states.
Unlike state court failures to address constitutional law diversities
dealing with individual rights, state court failures to address constitu-
tional differences dealing with governmental structure greatly trouble
Professor Gardner. Most state constitutional laws on individual rights
are, according to Professor Gardner, "dependent;" 64 that is, they "have
federal analogues capable of controlling the outcome of cases in which
both provisions apply." 6s For example, "a state search and seizure pro-
vision is dependent because it has a federal analogue-the Fourth
Amendment-capable of controlling the outcome of the case."6 Only
when a state's search and seizure provision provides greater protection
than that provided in the Fourth Amendment will the state provision
control. While Justice Brennan67 and others' have recently urged
state courts to read their state search and seizure provisions expansive-
ly, and while the differing language or history of certain state search
and" seizure provisions seemingly would accommodate such readings,
Professor Gardner is unhappy when such readings occur. He does not
believe such provisions can reflect differing views about reasonable
searches and seizures sifnce he finds the prospect of significant varia-
tions in state constitutional law "just too implausible to take serious-
ly."' He says, "Americans are now a people who are so alike from
61. Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparative American Judicial Systems, 24 U. RICH. L RnV. 171,
181-86 (1990).
62. In re Sunshine Law, 255 N.W. 2d 635, 636 (Mich. 1977).
63. Goldberg v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (Nev. 1977).
64. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 807.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 762 n.1.
68. Id. at 762-63 nn.5-7.
69. Id. at 818. He later adds "it is simply implausible that these different constitutional
[Vol. 5:164
UNEVEN DISCOURSE
state to state"70 that "the elements of basic human dignity" 7' can not
truly be "something very different to the inhabitants of Ohio and Indi-
ana."7 Further, even if the peoples of Ohio and Indiana did clearly
differ on search and seizure limits and did express those differences in
their constitutions, Professor Gardner would urge those states' courts to
look the other way. Recognizing such differences, he says, would seem
"vaguely antidemocratic," 73 would appear to be "poor sportsman-
ship",74 and would be taken as "some kind of political dirty trick."75
In his view, such independent state constitutional interpretation is "po-
tentially dangerous," 76 as it constitutes a "threat to national stabili-
ty" 77 because "differences at the expense of unity"78 would be
stressed.
By contrast, state court failures to address constitutional differen-
ces regarding governmental structure do trouble Professor Gardner.
Most state constitutional provisions defining government are, according
to the professor, "independent," 79 in that, they "cannot be dis-
placed"80 or affected8l by federal law, "regardless of whether an ana-
logous federal constitutional provision exists."82 For example, he finds
that "a state constitutional provision governing executive power is inde-
pendent because the state court's construction of that provision will
define the extent of the governor's power regardless of how the Su-
preme Court interprets the powers of the President under the federal
Constitution."83 Comparably, the aforedescribed state constitutional
provisions dealing with the judiciary are independent. Professor Gardner
laments that these independent provisions have not been subjected to
appropriate state constitutional discourse; existing discourse has failed
because state courts have employed "the federal analysis and terms of
debate" even though "federal law ... is powerless to affect" state
doctrines can be attributed to differences in the fundamental character and values of the people
of the states." Id. at 826.
70. Id. at 818.
71. Id. at 825. •
72. Id.
73. Id. at 829.
74. Id. at 830.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 833.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 807.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 808.
82. Id. at 807.
83. Id.
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judicial construction of "independent state constitutional provisions. " '
Presumedly the professor is troubled because the peoples of Ohio and
Indiana do (and should) differ about the defining elements of a tripar-
tite state government and because judicial recognition of such differ-
ences would not be antidemocratic, poor sportsmanship, some kind of
political dirty trick, or a threat to national stability.
While I join Professor Gardner in lamenting the failures of dis-
course about state constitutionalism and governmental structure, I find
that his premise about the extent of these failures is insufficiently sup-
ported and probably wrong. Additionally, his lack of suggestions about
correcting such failures is itself regrettable.
In support of his premise that discourse about state constitution-
alism and governmental structure is inadequate due to misplaced reli-
ance on "the federal analysis and terms of debate,"95 Professor Gard-
ner refers chiefly to the political question doctrine, the legislative
speech or debate protections, and the legislative veto.6 He cites no
state court case nor secondary source in the latter two areas.s7 Regard-
ing political question, he finds the doctrine should be far less restrictive
for state courts than for federal courts,m after noting that "some courts
have more or less expressly incorporated the leading federal cases into
the state's political question jurisprudence."89 One of the state courts
cited was the Ohio Supreme Court.", In the case, the court did look to
a U.S. Supreme Court decision, but only for a general description of
the political question doctrine. 9' The Ohio court did say that while the
federal courts employed the doctrine in cases involving foreign rela-
tions, war powers, the processes for ratifying constitutional amendments
and enacting statutes, the status of Indian tribes, and the guarantee to
every state of a republican form of government, Ohio courts applied the
doctrine primarily in election cases.' The court proceeded to cite to
earlier Ohio cases on the doctrine.' After quoting two provisions of
the Ohio Constitution on lawmaking, 94 the court found that the doc-
-84. Id. at 808.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 808-09.
87. Id. at 809 nn.204, 205.
88. Id. at 808-09.
89. Id. at 808.
90. Id. at 808 n.200, citing State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 423 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio "1981).
91. State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 423 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ohio 1981).





trine did not apply to a challenge to a controlling board's appropria-
tions activities.
5
Another court cited by Professor Gardner was the Illinois Supreme
Court.9 In the case, a U.S. Supreme Court decision was again used to
define generilly the political question doctrine. 97 The Illinois court,
however, also used earlier Illinois precedents and an Illinois statute to
determine a challenge to a political party's authority over an appoint-
ment to fill a vacancy in the General Assembly, an issue not likely to
trigger federal politicl question concerns.9
While surely there is some failed discourse of state constitution-
alism in cases involving state governmental power, I am not convinced
that such failures predominate and that states frequently err in relying
upon "the federal analysis and terms of debate."99 The earlier review
of state judicial articles suggests that there has been much successful
discourse on state constitutionalism during considerations of at least
some state constitutional laws on governmental identity. A similar re-
view of state court decisions regarding who in government has
responsibilities for procedural and substantive laws guiding the judicial
system would also establish there has been much successful discourse
on state constitutionalism. Frequently, these cases are resolved by ex-
ploring the inherent judicial power contemplated, but not expressed, in
the current state constitution. Such resolution recognizes that the inher-
ent judicial power may have changed as the state's judicial article
changed and that such power is significantly different from inherent
judicial power elsewhere.
D. PROMOTING BETTER DISCOURSE ABOUT AMERICAN
GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE
What can be done to spur better discourse on state constitution-
alism regarding governmental structure? Contemporary discourse seem-
ingly is neither failed nor doomed to failure as discourse on individual
rights should be if Professor Gardner is correct. Rather, present dis-
course on governmental structure seems uneven. While Professor Gard-
ner agrees that more and better discourse on governmental structure is
95. Id.
96. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 808 n.200, citing Kiuk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790 (Il1.
1988).
97. Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 796-797 (Il. 1988).
98. Id. at 796-97.
99. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 808.
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needed, regrettably he offers no "serious proposal",1°° or even a
"guidepost," ° ' on the "set of conventions""° which might "allow
participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims" 0 3 about
state constitutional law in this area. I shall conclude with a few obser-
vations intended to guide the development of such a set of conventions.
It must first be better recognized that the more recent drafters of
American state constitutions had broader sources of materials on which
to rely than did their earlier counterparts. They had not only the federal
analysis and terms of debate, but also the seemingly more relevant
materials from other states and interested professional organizations.
Consider the twentieth century movement toward court unification,
defined as a consolidated court system which is centrally funded and
managed. This movement was primarily accomplished through state
constitutional amendments, often including judicial rulemaking
reforms... and producing today a rich diversity of approaches. In join-
ing this movement, many state constitutional drafters looked to earlier
actions of sister states or to the recommendations of such influential
organizations as the American Bar Association, the American Judicature
Society and the National Municipal League.' s Likewise, since many
states have adopted piecemeal certain constitutional principles, involving
court unification, later constitutional writers had available a series of
works by their in-state predecessors. The aforedescribed history of the
Illinois judicial article demonstrates how a state has moved incre-
mentally toward delegating broader, and increasingly more exclusive,
powers to their judiciary.
While Professor Gardner correctly observes that there is too much
misplaced reliance on the federal analysis and terms of debate during
discourse on. governmental structure, he fails to provide any guideposts
about the proper place, if any, for federal constitutional discourse. Sure-
ly there is some place in state constitutional analysis and debate for
consideration of federal constitutional thinking on checks and balances,
separation of powers, and the meaning of executive, legislative, and
- judicial power. In addition, there are at least some express federal
constitutional limits on the identity of state government. For example,
100. Id. at 835.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 767.
103. Id. at 768.
104. For an account of the court unification movement, see Allan Ashman and Jeffrey A.
Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1974).
105. Id. at 5-19 (reviewing these groups' recommendations).
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each state must have a "Republican Form of Government"; t 6 no new
state can be "formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other
state'; 10 7 no new state can be "formed by the junction of two or
more states, or parts of states, without the consent ... of the Con-
gress";3 8 and each state must give "Full Faith and Credit... to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.""°
Choices about the attributes of state government are further constrained
by federal constitutional provisions on the procedural requirements for
adjudication, particularly in criminal law,110 the taking of proper-
ty,' and the deprivation of liberty and property." 2
Given his dislike for independent state constitutional interpretation
of individual rights and his desire that there be no state constitutional
discourse in this area, Professor Gardner's chief concern about mis-
placed state court reliance on federal analysis and debate involves state
constitutional discourse on the role of the three branches of each state
government. Professor Gardner illustrates this concern by noting that
the extent of a Governor's powers cannot be defined by the extent of a
President's powers," 3 though he cites no state cases in which such a
definition actually occurred." 4 Presumedly, he would. urge that inher-
ent state judicial power typically not be defined by the cases on in-
herent federal judicial power, a proper request given the aforedescribed
differences between federal and state judicial articles. Further, he would
presumably counsel, correctly, that General Assemblies should operate
quite differently from Congress. But, given such differences, is federal
constitutional discourse on national executive, legislative and judicial
authority wholly irrelevant? I think not, and suggest an appropriate
convention of state constitutionalism be developed; such a convention
should address the role of federal constitutional thinking on separation
of powers in state constitutional analysis and debate. In my view, even
where there are no express or implied federal constitutional limits on
state governmental structure, it is still appropriate for a state court to
use a federal court's general descriptions of separation of powers con-
cerns. Proper use, however, requires that the state court apply those
106. US. CONST. ar. IV, § 4.
107. Id. at § 3. ,
108. Id.
109. Id. at § 1.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI and VIII.
111. Id. at amend. V.
112. Id. at amend. XIV.
113. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 807.
114. Id.
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generalities to the particulars of the state's own governmental scheme.
Thus, unlike Professor Gardner, I am not troubled by an Ohio or an
Illinois court's limited use of federal court precedent on the political
question doctrine. In each setting, the state court applied the federal
court's general discussion to the unique circumstances within its own
borders. For me as well, the convention would permit considered, and
perhaps allow even wholesale, state court adoption of specific federal
court rulings on governmental powers. Adoption of federal rulings
would be most appropriate where the relevant state and federal constitu-
tional provisions are very similar and where there is no evidence sug-
gesting that the relevant state provisions were seen by their drafters, or
are seen today, as requiring rulings different from their federal counter-
parts. Exemplary may be the federal provisions defining: "high crimes
and misdemeanors" for impeachment purposes;" 5 "good behavior" by
judges;" 6 when an executive is unable "to discharge the powers and
duties of ... office";'" "disorderly behavior" permitting "punish-
ment" of a legislator," the processes for reconsidering legislative ac-
tions not signed by the executive; 19 and, appropriations made by law,
so that money can be drawn from the Treasury. 2  A convention of
state constitutionalism should also permit considered state court adop-
tion of specific rulings on governmental powers rendered in a sister
state. While Professor Gardner may be right that the political question
doctrine should be far less restrictive for state than for federal
courts,121 there may be good reason (and comparable constitutional
language to support the proposition) that the doctrine be similarly ap-
plied in two American states.
Another convention guiding the "use and interpretation"'2 of
state constitutional law on governmental structure involves the need for
greater consideration of the particular role each state constitution plays
115. U.S. CONST. at. 11, § 4. Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, Pt. 2, § 2; FLA. CONST. art.
II, § 17(a) ("misdemeanor in office"); KANSAS CONST. art. II, § 28.
116. US. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a) (removal of judges for
"present unfitness to hold office).
117. US. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 6.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Compare ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 54; ARIz. CONST. art. IV,
Pt. 2, § 11; FLA. CONST. arL III, § 4(d) (punishment for "contempt or disorderly conduct');
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 14.
119. US. CONsT. art. I, § 7. Compare ARK CONST. art. VI, § 15; CoLO. CONST. art. IV, §
12; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 14(b).
120. US. CONST. art. I, § 9. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 72; CoLO. CoNsr. art. V,
§ 33; L.A. CONST. art. 1H, § 16 (need for "specific appropriation"); N.M. CONsT. art. IV, § 30,
121. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 808-09.
122. Id. at 834.
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in defining that state's government. Some state constitutions, like the
federal constitution, are both bare-boned and stable, with no significant
history of amendment and only an occasional need for judicial interpre-
tation. Other state constitutions are more detailed and fluid. The history
and provisions of the many Illinois judicial articles contrast sharply
with the stability of Article Il of the United States Constitution. Bare-
boned and stable constitutional provisions, infrequently interpreted by
the courts, should be used less frequently to resolve separation of pow-
ers and governmental structure disputes. If the discourse of state consti-
tutionalism is to reflect the different roles which state constitutions play
in defining state government, how should such reflections occur? In
discussing individual constitutional rights, Professor Gardner offers
words of guidance. He says that some state constitutions must "be
viewed as something less than a 'real' constitution ... but something
more than a statute." 123 He goes on:
Perhaps state constitutional provisions might be viewed, like stat-
utes, as outcomes of frankly pluralistic power struggles, but con-
cerning subjects that the polity wants for some reason to remove
from the political agenda for some period of time. Indeed, this
seems to be the -direction in which state supreme courts have
moved; they are generally unwilling to invoke the grandest inter-
pretative strategies of constitutionalism, but are nevertheless forced
to treat constitutional positive law as somehow different from ordi-
nary statutory law.12
Recognition of the different roles state constitutions may play in defin-
ing governmental structure as a convention of state constitutionalism




To conclude, I suggest that Professor Gardner's fine article be
used as the catalyst for further discussion of a set of conventions for
state constitutional discourse about governmental structure. His article
reveals there are good reasons why the conventions for such discourse
should vary from the conventions for dialogue about individual rights. I
hope that my suggested "guideposts" will prove useful to the future
discourse on state governmental structure.
123. Id. at 833.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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